Selective Persecution: An Examination of the Social Security Administration continuing Disability Investigation Process of the Mentally Disabled by Martlock, Noel
In the Public Interest 
Volume 5 Number 1 Article 6 
4-1-1985 
Selective Persecution: An Examination of the Social Security 
Administration continuing Disability Investigation Process of the 
Mentally Disabled 
Noel Martlock 
University at Buffalo School of Law (Student) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/itpi 
 Part of the Disability Law Commons, and the Social Welfare Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Noel Martlock, Selective Persecution: An Examination of the Social Security Administration continuing 
Disability Investigation Process of the Mentally Disabled, 5 Buff. Envtl. L.J. 30 (1985). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/itpi/vol5/iss1/6 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in In the Public Interest by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Selective Persecution: An Examination of the Social Security Administration 
continuing Disability Investigation Process of the Mentally Disabled 
Cover Page Footnote 
Illustration by K.M. Spencer 
This article is available in In the Public Interest: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/itpi/vol5/iss1/6 
SELECTIVE PERSECUTION
An Examination of the Social Security Administration
Continuing Disability Investigation of the Mentally Disabled
by Noel Martlock
On or about May 9, 1977, Mr. Laurence Hooker was
found to be eligible for Social Security Disability payments
because he was a chronic schizophrenic with episodic anti-
social acting out.' He had attempted suicide on at least
one prior occasion.
On or about October 1, 1980, Edward Siatunco, a
disability evaluation analyst with the California Department
of Social Services, commenced a continuing disability in-
vestigation of Mr. Hooker. Siacunco solicited medical
records from Mr. Hooker's psychiatrist, which stated that
Mr. Hooker was anxious, suspicious, and had ideas of
persecution. Hooker had a seriously impaired ability to
relate to people and could not respond appropriately to
work pressure, supervision, and co-workers. Mr. Hooker's
psychiatrist, Dr. Don DeFrancisco, had diagnosed him as
a paranoid schizophrenic with consistent symptoms requir-
ing on-going treatment with tranquilizers and supportive
psychotherapy. Dr. DeFrancisco noted that Mr. Hooker's
prognosis was poor and little improvement could be
expected.
Nonetheless, Mr. Hooker was directed, on October 30,
1980, to undergo an examination with Dr. Boo N. Chiong,
a consulting psychiatrist with the California Department
of Social Services (DSS). On November 11, 1980, Dr.
Chiong reported that Mr. Hooker could be rehabilitated
with continuing supportive therapy and could perform sim-
ple jobs, such as gardening, in which he would have little
contact with people.
Despite both psychiatrists' diagnoses and recommen-
dations, Siacunco determined that Hooker was ineligible
for disability benefits because the medical examinations
showed he was able to do simple, non-stressful jobs if he
had appropriate medication.
Subsequently, both Mr. Hooker's wife and his psychia-
trist submitted additional documents to further inform
Siacunco of Mr. Hooker's suicidal tendencies, his diagnosis
of paranoid schizophrenia, and his total inability to work.
Dr. DeFrancisco warned that Mr. Hooker's condition might
worsen if he was terminated from disability benefits.
On February 18, 1981, Dr. Werner A. Kohlmeyer, a
psychiatric consultant employed by the Social Security Ad-
ministration (SSA), disagreed with Siacunco's termination
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decision, noting that the medical evidence did not indicate
any improvement in Mr. Hooker's condition. Dr. Kohlmeyer
stated that Mr. Hooker would have difficulty handling the
stress of a job.
Despite the uncontroverted medical evidence, Siacuno
and other unknown officials "arbitrarily and capriciously and
with reckless disregard for Mr. Hooker's well-being, ter-
minated him from disability payments retroactively to
November 1, 1980."'
Following this termination decision, on September 16,
1981, SSA demanded that Mr. Hooker repay all benefits
he had received since February, 1981, a sum of over
$3,000. Mr. Hooker filed for reconsideration of the denial
of benefits on November 6, 1981. However, on December
18, 1981, co-defendant Dr. Eugene Ermen, denied Mr.
Hooker's petition for reconsideration despite all the medical
evidence of Mr. Hooker's total disability.
Mr. Hooker's mental status rapidly deteriorated. He
was depressed and destructive. He also became assaultive
towards his family, forcing his wife and children to seek
refuge in a home for battered women. On April 12, 1982,
Mr. Hooker committed suicide.
Nonetheless, SSA pursued Mrs. Hooker for the
$3,000. Mrs. Hooker appealed to an Administrative Law
Judge, who, on September 18, 1982, ruled that SSA had
erred in terminating Mr. Hooker's disability payments.
The lawsuit filed on behalf of Barbara Hooker and her
family by ACLU of Southern California and the national
organization of ACLU seeks $3.5 million in damages from
SSA, California DSS, and their individual officials for
violating Laurence Hooker's rights to life, liberty and due
process of law.
The Hooker case raises significant questions concer-
ning Social Security law and policy, especially as it relates
to Social Security Disability and Supplemental Security In-
come benefits to people with mental disabilities. Is the
Hooker case atypical, or an example of current policy im-
plemented by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services and the Social Security Administration? If the
Hooker case is not atypical, how and why is this happen-
ing to the mentally disabled? Is the law changing? Should
Social Security policy change?
History of the
Social Security Amendments
The disability portion of the Old Age Survivors Disabili-
ty and Health Insurance Act (OASDHI) first came into be-
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ing in 1956. 3 Amendments eliminated the reduction of
benefits for those also receiving Workmens Compensation
benefits (1958), removed the minimum age requirement of
fifty, and introduced the trial work period.4 In 1965 the
eligibility requirements were liberalized by replacing the re-
quirement that the disability be of long continued and in-
definite duration with the requirement that the disability be
expected to last for a continuous period of twelve months.'
It was during this time that the Kemer doctrine was
adopted by courts ruling on Social Security Disability cases.
It held that the theoretical ability to work could not be us-
ed to deny benefits. The Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit ruled that the government must prove the claimant
could perform work that was actually available in the area
in which the claimant lived.6
In 1967 the liberal trend began to be reversed.7 The
most significant changes came in amendments which
changed the definition of disability. Both physical and men-
tal disabilities were redefined to be those impairments which
lead to the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical
or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for
a continuous period of not less than twelve months." The
amendments also provided that a person shall be determined
to be. under a disability only if his physical or mental im-
pairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, consider-
ing his age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the
national economy.
However, even with the imposition of stricter eligibili-
ty requirements, the trust funds for Disability Insurance (DI)
were eroding rapidly. The inception of the Supplemental
Security Income (SSI) program in 1972, and the black lung
program in 1976 put additional stress on the Social Security
Trust funds and greatly increased the number of people
receiving benefits.9
Thus Congress passed the Social Security Amend-
ments of 1977. These amendments were designed to bring
a balance between intake and outlays from the Social
Security Fund. They provided for both an increase in the
FICA taxable amount on all earnings as well as a raise in
the ceiling of income levels which would be taxed."
Although the 1977 amendments were designed to set
the OASDHI fund in balance, those changes seemed in-
sufficient to keep the DI fund solvent. Both Congress and
the Carter administration became concerned about the
quality of administration of the DI program. These concerns
were based in part on the issue of review of current reci-
pients of DI benefits. Under the original version of the Social
Security Act, only certain kinds of disability cases were
reviewed:
(1) those in which the disabled beneficiary's
medical condition was expected to improve,
(2) those in which a beneficiary's earnings
record indicated work activity,
(3) those in which a beneficiary voluntari-
ly reported work activity or medical improve-
ment. 11
Members of congress believed this structure for review
was too loose in form. Errors in initial acceptances were
not detected and DI claimants who may have benefited
from improvements in medical technologies and therapies,
were not reviewed. Apparently foreseeing these concerns,
SSA began tightening up the quality assurance (QA) pro-
cess. Through the QA process, Continuing Disability In-
vestigations were stepped up from 1975-1980, and the
result was a stable or slightly declining population of DI
claimants receiving benefits.' 2
The 1980 Social Security Amendments, much like the
1977 amendments, were aimed at putting a cap on
benefits, reducing costs, and increasing work incentives.
The significant part of the legislation was the restructuring
of the periodic reviews of initial decisions. The result of this
restructuring was the requirement of a Continuing Disability
Review (CDR) process to commence in January 1982.13
It is this provision of the 1980 Social Security Amendments
and its implementation by SSA that has had an extensive
negative impact on the mentally disabled and is the sub-
ject of the remainder of this article.
A Fair, Remedial and Necessary CDI Process:
The SSA View
Paul B. Simmons, Deputy Commissioner for Programs
and Policies of SSA, submitted written testimony, to the
House Sub-Committee On Retirement Income And
Employment that:
as many as 584,000 beneficiaries, about 18
percent of the disability rolls, did not meet the
eligibility criteria... that [a] special SSA review
of 24,000 cases (representative of 60 percent
of the disability beneficiary population) in-
dicated that 35 percent were not disabled ....
[A]nother special SSA review of a statistically
valid random sample of 2,800 cases (represen-
tative of the entire disability rolls) indicated that
30 percent were not entitled to benefits .... 4
On the basis of this data, the SSA initiated the Conti-
nuing Disability Review (CDR) process in March of 1981
- eight months before the statutorily mandated starting
date of January 1982. The administration maintained that
the early start of the CDR process would relieve pressure
on staff and achieve greater accuracy, by allowing the SSA
to process the 800,000 DI cases in eighteen months as
opposed to 9 months."'
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The figures Simmons gave for ineligible beneficiaries
and for staffing the state agencies are significant for these
figures are not accepted by other authorities. His
statements concerning the CDR process seem to be con-
tradictory to the facts which were fleshed out in a number
of court cases and numerous Senate hearings, as well as
the House Sub-Committee On Retirement Income and
Employment Hearings. Simmons outlined the CDR pro-
cess, stating for example, that:
The beneficiary is asked to give the state agency
information about the current status of his con-
dition and about when and where he recently
received medical treatment. The information is
used to obtain all current medical evidence that
is available.... If the current medical evidence
is not detailed enough or if the beneficiary has
had no recent medical treatment, the state
agency arranges a special examination of the
person's present condition called a consultative
examination (CE), at government expense.
1 6
Simmons provides some noteworthy statistics with
regard to the usage of consultative examinations in the
CDR process:
Through the first 13 months of the accelerated
review, about 54 percent of the continuing
disability cases reviewed by the state agencies
had consultative examinations performed. This
is about 15 percent higher than the percentage
of initial and continuing cases in which con-
sultative examinations were performed. I should
note that in fiscal years 1983 and 1984, we are
budgeting for a 60 percent consultative ex-
amination rate in continuing disability cases
... I want to emphasize that in every CDR
case we obtain evidence of the beneficiary's cur-
rent medical condition - either from his physi-
cian or through consultative medical examina-
tion - before making a decision. 7
Simmons claimed that the state agencies evaluated the
medical evidence to determine whether the beneficiaries
continued to be disabled within the meaning of the law.
He emphasized that there had been no termination quota
imposed for the CDR reviews. State agencies were in-
structed to develop and adjudicate each case on its own
merits according to the Federal regulations and the SSA's
operating policies and procedures. 8
Describing the decision-making process within the
SSA, Simmons stated that if a beneficiary is found not to
be disabled, the person is given advance notice of the fin-
ding and ten days to notify the agency as to whether he/she
disagrees with the decision and plans to submit additional
evidence. The beneficiary is then given ten additional days
in which to submit the evidence. If the agency decides, upon
reviewing the evidence, that the beneficiary is still not disabl-
ed, the person is given notice that he/she may file for a
reconsideration within sixty days of the notice of termina-
tion. At the reconsideration stage, the state agency secures
additional updated medical information from the
beneficiary's treating sources and requests a consultative
examination if one is necessary. The reconsideration deci-
sion is made by different state agency personnel than those
who made the initial decision. A recipient's benefits con-
tinue for three months following the initial termination deci-
sion. If the beneficiary is still deemed not to be disabled
at the reconsideration stage, that individual has sixty days
to request a hearing before an administrative law judge, at
which he/she may appear in person and present evidence.
Pending an adverse decision at the AJ stage, the
beneficiary may appeal to the ALJ Appeals Council and
further to a federal district court.' 9
The most illuminating testimony of Deputy Commis-
sioner Simmons occurred during his description of SSA's
views about the impact of the CDR review on claimants
and beneficiaries, especially those with mental impairments.
Simmons revealed that since March of 1981, 343,000 DI
beneficiaries were subjected to the CDR process. More than
139,000 had their benefits terminated in that same
period.
20
Answering the outcry regarding the CDR process from
many DI recipients, families, friends and mental health pro-
fessionals, Simmons stated that DI recipients did not
understand that the CDR process was required by law. He
believed that many beneficiaries assumed they had retired
on DI and had never expected their cases to be reviewed.
Simmons acknowledged that terminated beneficiaries had
to make tremendous psychological adjustments. He add-
ed that current economic conditions such as high
unemployment and a scarcity of jobs contributed to their
anxieties.'
Deputy Commissioner Simmons took exception to
charges that the CDR process had been unfairly focused
on beneficiaries with mental impairments. He emphasized
two major factors which might have accounted for the large
number of mental impairment cases processed through
CDR's. First, there is a greater percentage of mental im-
pairments among beneficiaries who have been on the rolls
for some time than among those newly enrolled. Second
mental impairments are not considered to be permanently
disabling, which releases more of those cases for CDI
review.
Contrary to Simmons' statements above, improper use
of disability determination procedures, and not the fact that
beneficiaries with mental impairments are younger and stay
on the DI rolls longer, more appropriately explains why
more of these people are being funnelled through the CDR
process. Additionally, the consensus of most mental health
professionals is that impairments such as depressive
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psychosis, bi-polar disorders, and schizophrenic disorders,
though treatable, are incurable and therefore permanently
disabling.
Deputy Commissioner Simmons stated that the SSA
had implemented special procedures to assist people who
have problems dealing with the evaluation and review pro-
cess. He stipulated that state agencies had been instructed
by SSA to contact relatives, or other interested parties,
when gathering evidence for the adjudication of claims.
22
The remainder of Simmons' testimony before the
House and Senate Sub-Committees consisted of a defense
of the SSA's activities in the CDR process. Simmons
asserted that SSA had not targeted the mentally disabled
for review and expulsion from SSDB and SSI rolls; the
agency was complying fully with the requirements of the
1980 Amendments and termination quotas were not pro-
mulgated for administrative law judges.
23
Simmons asserted that all cases were reviewed by pro-
perly qualified medical personnel and that all requirements
of the law were followed. This indeed was not the case.
There have been numerous instances of podiatrists,
pediatricians, and internists conducting the psychiatric con-
sultative examinations. Although qualified medical person-
nel, they were clearly not the appropriate specialists as re-
quired by law.
Deputy Commissioner Simmons sketched a portrait
of a generally efficient but overburdened DI evaluation and
review system. He claimed that the agency was acting in
the most humane manner possible. The truly disabled, he
stated, had a safety net and only those who were not men-
tally disabled were removed from the DI rolls. Thus the hor-
ror stories that portray truly disabled people having their
disability benefits terminated were only isolated incidents
in the overall review process.
The question that must be asked is whether this por-
trayal of the Deputy Commissioner is a reality, or a situa-
tion of a bureaucracy that has run amuck. To determine
whether the Deputy Commissioner's portrayal of the pro-
cedures of the DI program as applied to the mentally im-
paired is correct, we must look to the procedures
themselves as well as court decisions involving SSA's ap-
plication of the procedures to the mentally impaired.
Procedures and Requirements for Determining
Mental Disability in the CDI Process
There is a five step sequential process for determin-
ing eligibility for DI and SSI benefits. 24 The first step is to
ascertain whether the beneficiary is engaged in substantial
gainful activity (SGA). SGA is essentially work which is
performed for money that involves significant mental or
physical efforts. 25 If the person is capable of SGA, they
are automatically deemed not disabled and the process
stops. 26 If not, the next step is to determine whether or
not the beneficiary has a severe impairment that significant-
ly limits any kind of work activity. If the impairment does
not meet the severity test, the person is declared non-
disabled and the process stops. 27 If the impairment meets
the severity test, the process moves to step three. The third
step is an assessment of the severity of the beneficiary's
impairment, or whether the disability meets or equals
the government listing of impairments.2 8 The listing
describes mental and physical impairments for each of the
major body systems that are considered severe enough to
preclude SGA. If the impairment meets or equals the severi-
ty in the listing, the process is stopped and the beneficiary
is considered disabled and continues to receive benefits.
29
If not, then the fourth step is to determine if the beneficiary
has the ability to engage in SGA. If so, the process stops
and the person is determined not to be disabled. 30 If the
person does not have the ability, then the fifth step, the
so-called grid system, is initiated. The grid is used to con-
sider whether the beneficiary's impairment together with
his/her age, education, work experience, and physical/men-
tal ability to perform various types of work related func-
tions, termed Residual Functional Capacity (RFC), prevents
the person from doing other substantial work that exists
in the national economy.3
It is important to note that although the function of the
grid is to take notice of existing jobs in the national
economy, the grid is inapplicable when, for example, a per-
son's RFC does not meet the level required to trigger the
process.32 The issue of meeting the level wherein the grid
procedure is initiated, applies to the factors of age, educa-
tion, and work experience much the same as it applies to
RFC. Each factor has a cut-off point wherein the grid must
not be applied. However, SSA is still required to go beyond
the listings and determine ability to work.
Since the grid procedure is so complex, it is open to
substantial abuse. A common misuse is the application of
the procedure for determining RFC for a person with a
physical impairment to a person with a mental impairment.
To determine RFC for a physically impaired person requires
RFC to measure physical exertional capacity in terms of
ability to perform sedentary, light, medium or heavy work.1
3
For a person with a mental impairment, RFC should be
measured by the extent that the psychopathology restricts
activities, interests, and ability to care for oneself.
3 4
As explained above there are five stages that the
beneficiary might possibly have to pursue to ultimately
reach a favorable decision in the CDR process.35 If at any
stage the claimant is found not to be disabled, according
to the 1977 amendments, that person must accept any
work, anywhere, in the national economy. This poses a
significant burden on the mentally impaired who, more often
than not, are unable to uproot themselves from friends,
family, and mental health support without decompensating.
The misapplication and abuse of the five step sequen-
tial process for determining eligibility of mentally impaired
individuals for SSDS and SSI benefits has led to numerous
Federal District and Circuit Courts of Appeals cases.
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The Issues in Court
In a number of court cases, contrary to Deputy Com-
missioner Simmons' assertions, the SSA has misapplied
and abused the procedures for determining eligibility of
mentally impaired people for continued SSDS and SSI
benefits. The most significant, Minnesota Mental Health
Assoc. Heckler, made its way through the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals, and was decided November 4,
1983.36 It concerned the policy initiated by SSA in 1980
regarding eligibility for mentally impaired claimants and
beneficiaries. In accordance with the policy, SSA determin-
ed that persons who failed the third stage of the test
because their mental impairments did not meet or equal
the listing of impairments, retained sufficient RFC to do
at least unskilled work. 37 Documents received by the
District Court showed a policy shift.3" SSA central office
acknowledged to the court that prior to the policy shift there
were a number of cases that did not meet or equal the listing
of impairments, but were precluded from work. Disability
in those cases was based on restricted RFC and was
awarded on a medical-vocational basis. The decision
whether a mentally impaired beneficiary or claimant was
to receive benefits was reduced to a one step process -
does the individual's impairment meet or equal the listing?
39
The Court noted that SSA's own regional medical advisor
for the Chicago region had stated:
it is practically impossible to meet the listing
... for any individual whose thought processes
are not completely disorganized, is not blatantly
psychotic, or is not having a psychiatric
emergency requiring immediate hospitalization
... In fact a person may be commitable due
to mental illness according to the State's Men-
tal Health Codes and yet found capable of un-
skilled work utilizing our disability standards
40
The court received testimony from psychiatrists and
rehabilitation psychologists which satisfactorily
demonstrated that the listing of impairments did not
measure ability. The net effect, therefore, of requiring a
mentally impaired individual to either meet or equal the
listing of impairments, and failing to do so, was to deem
them as having the residual functional capacity to do un-
skilled work. On that basis the individual was thus deem-
ed not disabled and, therefore, ineligible for benefits. Again,
in court testimony, Dr. Sandor Berendi, SSA's Chicago
regional medical advisor stated:
Currently, a significant number of psychiatric
patients who clinically manifest an inability to
engage in persistent SGA are denied disability
benefits due to the fact that they fall short of
the psychiatric listings. Many individuals with
serious residual symptoms (most chronic
schizophreics) ... are currently denied as hay- "
ing a severe impairment with a RFC enabling
them to do at least unskilled work."1
This procedure, as noted by the court, is clearly in
violation of the procedures set out in SSA's own regula-
tions. 41
Since SSA had no effective defense, the district court
issued, and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed,
a preliminary injunction against the SSA. The court then
ordered SSA to review, readjudicate and restore ongoing
benefits, where applicable, to all eligible members of the
class whose benefits were terminated on the basis of their
ability to perform unskilled work.43 The defendant was
ordered to notify class members that their cases were be-
ing reviewed and they may be required to submit additional
evidence about their impairments, because the initial deci-
sion might have been in error. If the initial decision had been
in error as determined by the new review, eligible class
members would be entitled to back benefits.
44
Minnesota Mental Health represents a significant ex-
ample of the SSA setting forth and implementing an un-
published regulation and relying on it as a matter of policy,
in violation of its own regulations. As noted by the courts
involved, this policy had a devastating effect on the men-
tally disabled, and in this case, a preliminary injunction was
an appropriate remedy wherein the plaintiff class would be
restored to the position they were in prior to the effect of
the illegal policy.
Another class action lawsuit Schisler u. Heckler, also
dealt with misapplication and abuse of legal procedures in
the CDR process. 4- The plaintiffs sought an order for a
preliminary injunction requiring the defendant, SSA, to
comply with their own regulations, and enjoining them from
using illegal procedures to terminate members of plaintiffs'
subclass from SSDB and SSI benefits.
The plaintiffs charged that the defendants' actual prac-
tices in performing CDR's did not conform to the re-
quirements of their rules; required home visits in failure-to-
respond cases were not made and were indirectly
discouraged, and treatment sources were not always con-
tacted. The plaintiffs charged that the latter complaint was
due to defendants' dual development practice in which
medical evidence was obtained simultaneously from both
treating sources and non-treating consultative exaxminers.
Thus a detailed report would be ordered from the con-
sultative examiner, and an unspecified report would be
ordered from the treating source. There would be no follow
up inquiries to the treating source and no notification to
the recipient or the source if requested data had not been
received. Furthermore, the plaintiffs stated that contrary
to policy, findings of the consultative examiners were given
equal or greater weight than information from the treating
sources, and in a routine manner, the consultative ex-
aminers were used as a substitute for the treating sources. 6
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The plaintiffs asserted that the result of this dual
evidence development practice had been the erroneous ter-
mination of SSDB and SSI benefits for hundreds of
thousands of mentally impaired individuals. The plaintiffs
charged that the misapplication and abuse of the pro-
cedures violated the subclass's rights under the Fifth
Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment, the Social
Security Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act, in that
such actions on the part of SSA allowed the subclass's
SSDB and SSI benefits to be terminated without due pro-
cess and without sufficient evidence for termination of
disability.
47
The Social Security Administration charged that there
was no basis in the complaint for the relief sought and that
to meet the burden of proof, SSA would have to search
through thousands of files, contrary to its own regulations
and previous court cases. 48 Judge Elfvin swept this objec-
tion aside, stating that to sustain the SSA's objection would
be contrary to requirements established by the 1981 Se-
cond Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Ellis v. Blum. 4'
Judge Elfvin stated further that even if SSA had to review
many individual cases to determine the adequacy of their
procedures, this would not be the sort of review of in-
dividual cases which would be subject to the exclusive
jurisdiction provided under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This review
would merely be an examination of evidence relevant to
what Judge Elfvin described as the overarching claim in
the case, and such examination would be available under
federal statutory and case law.50
Finally, SSA brought to the district court's attention
a case similar to Schisler, Smith v. Schweiker. 1 SSA
asserted that the Second Circuitfs opinion in Smith required
the dismissal of the Schisler action for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. In Smith, the plaintiff-class sought to
challenge SSA's definition of current disability and require
proof of medical improvement prior to termination of
benefits. The Court in Smith held that jurisdiction would
not be based on Title II of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g) since the plaintiff-class had not
demonstrated irreparable harm nor futility of exhaustion
of administrative remedies as required by Matthews v.
Eldridge.
52
Judge Elfvin used the Eldridge rule to show that in
Schisler, unlike in Smith, exhaustion would prove futile and
cause irreparable harm. The plaintiffs' benefits in Schisler
were not restored, and many suffered deterioration in their
mental impairments, whereas in Smith, the plaintiffs
benefits were restored.53 Additionally, Judge Elfvin
distinguished the two cases by pointing out that in Schissler
the charge was that SSA had failed to promulgate and issue
guidelines, whereas in Smith, the plaintiffs were challeng-
ing the regulations. For this and the above stated reasons,
mandemus jurisdiction would be proper.54
Having granted jurisdiction, the district court ordered
a preliminary injunction, because irreparable harms, such
as psychiatric deterioration, homelessness,'and even suicide
in some cases, made the facts in the Schisler case different
from those in Eldridge. Thus the holding in Eldridge, that
a full evidentiary hearing was not required before a
beneficiary's benefits were terminated, was not applicable
to Schisler.55 In Eldridge the court used a balancing test
to determine that the interest of the government in avoiding
the burden of a full fledged due process hearing outweigh-
ed the interest of the beneficiary in his/her right to benefits
and that the risk of erroneous deprivation of benefits was
minimal. The district court stated that due process required
the procedures to be tailored in light of the decision to be
made, and the capacities and circumstances of those who
were to be heard were to be considered to insure that they
were given a meaningful opportunity to present their case. 6
Therefore, in Schisler, the court granted a preliminary order
directing that:
before a cessation for failure to cooperate or
failure to respond may be issued, a home visit
or other in-person contact must be conducted
to determine whether the recipient is unwilling
or unable to respond. Furthermore, the cessa-
tion of benefits should not be permitted where
the unwillingness to cooperate is in fact at-
tributable to the mental impairment of the reci-
pient. In such cases the defendants must make
an effort to contact family members or health
services sources of the individual, in order to
obtain the information necessary to conduct the
disability investigation. 7
Judge Elfvin stated such a procedure was in accord
with the Eldridge balancing of factors test.5 8 Members of
the subclass had an important interest in their mental health
and rehabilitation, and the risk of erroneous deprivation
was high, due to the great possibility that a failure to
cooperate could be caused by the disabling mental impair-
ment and the huge number of CDR's processed in a short
period of time.
The district court next ordered SSA to comply with
its own published regulations as required by law. Specifical-
ly, the court ordered SSA to send informational inquiries
to all treatment and/or rehabilitative services identified by
the subclass members, pursuant to POMS § 2023 and
§ 2025. In addition, the court required SSA to specifically
tailor their requests for medical information so as to inform
the reporting source of the type and extent of evidence
sought.5"
The court subsequently ordered SSA to follow stated
rules and regulations by making specific follow-up inquiries
to sources from which information was sought, and utiliz-
ing treating sources for any additional testing or examina-
tion, if the source was both available and cooperative. 0
Where a non-treating physician's services are required, the
SSA was to select a physician who is both competent and
has the training and experience to perform the consultative
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examination required by POMS § 2027(f)(2). 61
Finally, Judge Elfvin ordered SSA to reopen the cessa-
tion decisions of all subclass members whose benefits were
terminated for failure to respond or cooperate. The district
court stated specifically that in cases where there had not
been in-person services, SSA should conduct home visits
and reexamine the previous termination decisions in view
of new observations. Where this was not possible or where
the individual beneficiary was unwilling or unable to
cooperate because of the nature of the mental impairment,
SSA was to contact a family member or health services
source of the individual to obtain the information needed
for an accurate CDR decision.
6
1
Judge Elfvin made clear in his order for a preliminary
injunction that:
the public interest does not disfavor issuance
of a preliminary injunction against precipitous
shifting of financial responsibility for the
psychiatrically disabled. Moreover defendant's
procedure jeopardizes the public policy favor-
ing deinstitutionalization of those mentally im-
paired individuals who can be accorded such
status.63
Both Minnesota Mental Health and Schisler are prime
examples of the egregious nature of the abuse and misap-
plication by SSA of the Social Security law and regulations.
Moreover these cases are representative of the overall pro-
blem of SSDB and SSI termination situations in other
jurisdictions."
A federal case, City of New York v. Heckler, struck
down the same policies overturned by the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Minnesota Mental Health. 65 City of
New York represents an example of SSA's nonac-
quiescence in decisions within a circuit. Judge Weinstein
was fully aware of the Schisler decisions and thereby
reflected his frustration with SSA's policies and practices
by declaring that City of New York raised:
difficult issues respecting protection of the
rights of claimants by the bureaucracy charg-
ed with dispensing Social Security Disability
and Supplemental Security Income benefits.
Courts assume that professionals such as doc-
tors, lawyers and managers responsible for im-
portant government institutions will enforce the
law with scrupulous impartiality and concern
for the rights of their clients - here those claim-
ing disability. That presumption of legality has
been rebutted by evidence of the denial of rights
of disabled persons acquies ced in by the pro-
fessionals charged with assisting them. The
result was particularly tragic in the instant case
because of its devastating effect on thousands
of menially ill pers6ns whose very disability
prevented them from effectively confronting the
system.
6
Judge Weinstein reviewed the SSA determination and
appeals process, as well as testimony relating to the tier
II and tier III review process which was an SSA evaluation
of the state agency adjudication procedures in the CDR
process.67 He noted Dr. Anne Geller's (Chief Consulting
Psychiatrist for SSA's New York regional office) testimony,
namely that:
[T]ier III reviews from Baltimore [SSA's head-
quarters] are both analyzed and followed in
order to avoid the issuance of bureaucratic
"demerits" within the system ... the standards
in those reviews constitute the best sources of
guidance for the determination of future disabil-
ity claims. A large number of returns from a
higher level causes the region and state ad-
ministrations to pressure the review physicians
to conform to the line from Baltimore.
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The standard of review at the tier III level caused the Depart-
ment of Social Services (DSS) to align its determination
decisions to unpublished policies of SSA. This was not uni-
que to New York.
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The district court granted mandemus jurisdiction with
regard to the plaintiffs case, for the same reasons as stated
in Schisler and Minnesota Mental Health. 0 The issue in
City of New York was exactly the same as in Minnesota
Mental Health. SSA had initiated an unpublished policy
of finding mentally impaired people non-disabled if they did
not meet or equal the listing of impairments. No evalua-
tion of RFC was done since there was a presumption by
SSA that the beneficiaries had an RFC to do at least un-
skilled work.7"
The district court ordered the reopening and redeter-
mination of benefit eligibility for the plaintiff class using ap-
propriate standards. The court additionally ordered a tem-
porary reinstatement of only current benefits to all class
members until SSA could properly determine eligibility of
each person. Finally the district court enjoined SSA from
using the disallowed procedures for the purpose of any new
terminations of beneficiaries. 2
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the order
of the district court in a unanimous decision on August 29,
1984. The Second Circuit criticized the SSA for what it
termed a "clandestine policy" of determining eligibility for
DI and SSI benefits, saying that the SSA policy which il-
legally and arbitrarily terminated beneficiaries, resulted in
deterioration of recipient's mental condition and
rehospitalization in most instances. This, the court said,
was hardly consistent with the remedial goals of the Social
Security Act and the nation's mental health policies."
Two additional cases further illustrate the SSA's
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tendencies to twist and trample on its own regulations, as
well as the law. The first case, Deleon v. Secretary of Health
and Human Services,7 4 raised two issues not previously
adjudicated: termination of benefits without proof of im-
provement of the beneficiary's medical condition, and ter-
mination of benefits through ruling on the effect of each
one of the beneficiary's multiple impairments without con-
sidering the effect of the impairments combined.
The plaintiff, Ricardo Deleon had a long history of
epilepsy with organic brain syndrome, intelligence border-
ing on mental retardation, paranoid schizophrenia, and
cerebral palsy resulting in deformities involving left leg and
left (dominant) hand. 75 The Social Security Administration
terminated Mr. Deleon's benefits, stating that he was no
longer disabled. An ALJ and the district court upheld the
termination, whereupon the plaintiff appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit. SSA did not consider
the effects of the combination of disabilities, nor did they
base their decision upon the improvement of Mr. Deleon's
impairments. They simply declared that he was no longer
disabled.7 6
The Second Circuit found that SSA improperly applied
the legal standard which it had laid down in Delcamater
v. Schweiker 7 and Schauer v. Schweker.8 Under that
standard SSA could terminate the benefits of an individual
previously adjudged disabled only upon substantial
evidence that the individual's condition had improved to
the point that he/she was no longer disabled, or that the
initial finding of disability was erroneous. 9
The Second Circuit also found that SSA violated clear-
ly announced case law which states that when a beneficiary
has multiple impairments, SSA must consider the effect
of the combination of the impairments. 80 The court revers-
ed the AL and district court termination decision, saying
that SSA failed to produce substantial evidence of no
disability.8'
In Parente v. Heckler,8 2 the plaintiff had multiple
disabilities of exogenous deformity, resultant in weight in
excess of 300 pounds, and coronary impairment with
edema of lower extremities, combined with paranoid
schizophrenia. SSA applied the same process as it had with
Mr. Deleon, resulting in termination of benefits. Citing
Deleon, the Second Circuit reversed the district court and
stated:
to classify a claimant as disabled, and then
draw precisely the opposite legal conclusion
without substantial evidence of improvement
violates not only the termination statute but
basic considerations of fairness.83
Once again SSA had found itself criticized by the courts
for its unconscionable and illegal removal of qualified
beneficiaries from the SSI and SSDB rolls.
These cases illustrate the pressures SSA applied to
the state agencies and ultimately to the beneficiaries of DI
and SSI benefits. In contrast, the following cases illuminate
the pressure placed on administrative law judges by the
SSA to restrict their allowance rate. Deputy Commissioner
Simmons, in his testimony to the House Subcommittee,
made no secret about this, and expressed SSA's deep con-
cern for what he perceived as abnormally high allowances
in favor of beneficiaries at the AL stage in the CDR ap-
peals process.
Two class action suits on behalf of administrative law
judges illustrate the problem of SSA's setting of the disabil-
ity benefit termination quotas. In Nash v. Califano, 84 the
plaintiff charged that not only was SSA setting quotas for
the number of disability cases to be adjudicated each week
in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),8 s
but that SSA had imposed a quality assurance program
to increase termination and restrict allowance of benefits.
Nash argued that the quality assurance program was also
in violation of the APA and the 5th Amendment of the
Constitution.86 Although the district court dismissed Nash's
suit for lack of jurisdiction, Nash appealed to the Court of
Appeals which granted him the right to bring suit against
SSA.8 7 The district court had stated if its decision were
overruled by the Second Circuit, upon remand it would cer-
tify a class action. To date, no decision has been rendered
in Nash II.
Another case, Association of Administrative Law
Judges (AALJ) v. Schweiker,88 was filed as a class action
on behalf of all AU's by their professional organization.
The District Court for the District of Columbia asserted
that this case was indistinguishable from Nash, and that
the APA created a comprehensive bulwark to safeguard
the independence of the Al's and protect them from agen-
cy interference. The court stated further that the in-
dependence granted to AL's was designed to maintain
public confidence in the essential fairness of the process
through which social security benefits were allocated, by
insuring impartial decisionmaking.8 9 The court ruled that
the administrative law judges had standing to sue to pro-
tect their independence.9" As in Nash, no final decision has
been rendered.
Nash and AALJ, seem to reflect some of the same dis-
turbing features found in City of New York and
Minnesota Mental Health. In the latter cases, SSA attemp-
ted to pre-determine the outcome of the CDR process by
setting goals and quotas and enforcing them with the threat
of removing the administration of disability determinations
from the states, whereas in the ALJ cases SSA threaten-
ed the removal of AU's from their jobs if their quotas were
not met.
The question remains as to why the SSA has under-
taken what seems to be a systematic program to remove
as many beneficiaries; especially the mentally ill, from the
DI and SSI rolls in such a short period of time, using
primarily extra-legal methods. As noted previously, the
goals of the 1977 and the 1980 amendments to the Social
Security Act were to reduce costs and to increase work
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incentives. 9' The monetary savings were estimated to be
about ten million dollars.92 However, as Senator Glenn
stated in written testimony submitted to Senator Heinz:
since the review in process began two years
ago, March 1981, the Social Security Ad-
ministration has terminated 45 percent of the
beneficiaries reexamined compared to GAO
estimate of 20 percent of beneficiaries, not
disabled. The president's budget for 1983 pro-
jected savings in the disability program of 3.5
billion dollars - or 325 times the original 1980
estimate. The procedures employed by the
Social Security Administration to judge the
disabilities of mentally ill persons deserve con-
gressional action ... the procedures used to
review the cases of the mentally ill people are
seriously flawed. Among the shortcomings in
the process, GAO found that 10 states did not
employ any psychiatrists for use in the review
process, mentally ill persons were not given a
realistic evaluation of their ability to work, and
examiners were encouraged to stress the
positive activities that a beneficiary could do -
such as feeding a cat or watching TV. Severe-
ly ill persons without the capacity to relate to
other human beings have been terminated from
the disability rolls because of their ability to boil
an egg or attend a movie (emphasis added).9
Senator Glenn's account of the GAO's findings certainly
does not comport with SSA Deputy Commissioner Sim-
mons' assertions of how the SSA and the state agencies
have been conducting the CDR review process, although
the deputy commissioner did acknowledge that physicians
other than psychiatrists were passing judgments on many
of the cases of mentally impaired beneficiars. 94 The GAO
study, however, correlates closely with some of the findings
of the courts in Minnesota Mental Health, Schisler, and City
of New York.9
It is very difficult, when one compares the findings in
these cases with the budgetary projection figures given by
Senator Glenn, not to draw the conclusion that SSA used
whatever means available to pervert the CDR review pro-
cess mandated by Congress to achieve budget reductions
in social spending. This perversion began in the Carter ad-
ministration but has been intensified during the current
Reagan regime.96
Whatever conclusion one draws from the House and
Senate hearings as well as the court cases, there should
be little or no dispute as to the effect the accelerated CDR
process has had on mentally impaired persons. The phrase
unmitigated disaster is an understatement.
Effects of the CDI Process
SSA Deputy Commissioner Paul Simmons, in his
testimony at both the House and Senate sub-committee
hearings, tried to sidestep the issue of the effects of the
accelerated CDR process on the mentally disabled. He
stated that in the vast majority of cases, only the nondisabl-
ed were removed from the rolls as a result of the CDR pro-
cess. The facts brought out in the class action lawsuits
against SSA have shown this statement to be false, with
regard to mentally disabled beneficiaries.
Mr. Simmons understated the havoc the CDR process
has wrought upon the mentally disabled. Both the Senate
Special Committee and the House Select Committee hear-
ings' transcripts contain an extensive report submitted by
Carol Bellamy, president of the New York City Council.9 7
This report reviews some of the effects of the CDR pro-
cess, both current and prospective.
As of fiscal year 1982, 463,000 New York State
residents received DI and SSI benefits; out of the 463,000,
167,700 people were mentally disabled. During fiscal year
1982, 5500 mentally disabled persons in New York State
were expected to be terminated from disability benefits, and
2300 of that 5500 were from New York City.9 8 The report
revealed statistics which reflected how the changes in SSA
policy regarding the case review process, effected New York
SSDB recipients.9 9 From May 2, 1980 to December 26,
1980, DI recipients were reviewed in New York State.
2,808 recipients' benefits were terminated which yielded
a 37% denial rate from the 7,597 recipients reviewed. A
year later, over 12,000 recipients were reviewed and 5,437
were terminated, a 44% termination rate.'00 The increase
in the denial rate for SSDB recipients was even more
dramatic over the next year-and-a-half, which meant
disastrous results for both local and state govenments. Add
to this a 22% increase in the denial rate for SSI recipients,
and the true effect of this cost shifting is realized.' 0'
The report reviewed a number of cases from South
Beach Psychiatric Center, Washington Heights Community
Mental Health Center and St. Francis Hospital Residence
for the Mentally Disabled, as well as other institutions. All
of these patients had on-going disabilities and all were ac-
tively delusional at the time of their termination. Several
of them had psychotic episodes in the SSA office. They
all had their benefits terminated and the reason given was
that their condition had improved.10 2 Some of these pa-
tients were reduced to a less than marginal existence on
welfare, while some were re-admitted to the state
psychiatric centers. The unlucky ones were evicted from
their apartments and left homeless on the streets, to seek
what help the could from the city's shelters for the
homeless.013 These cases are not isolated or atypical ex-
amples of the plight of people terminated from the Social
Security rolls.
The consequences of this termination process do not
end with the tragic consequences for the recipients. They
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involve a tremendous shifting of costs to the state and local
governments. The report estimated that more than
$27,000,000 in Social Security DI benefits would be lost
in fiscal year 1982.104 The report also estimated that total
New York State home relief costs would increase by more
than $7,000,000 as a result of DI beneficiary cutoffs (only
those mentally disabled are factored into these costs).'
The physicians, social workers and legal personnel
who were interviewed for the report shared the view that
the CDR process was a cruel hoax upon the mentally
disabled. They were particularly concerned about the ef-
fects on the mental health system and its ability to deliver
adequate services.'
0 6
The Bellamy Report, although it gives statewide data,
places emphasis on the New York City area. However, the
same problems are occurring upstate. Rochester Psychiatric
Center has been dealing with the consequences of the CDR
process in the Monroe and Livingston County area. The
Triage Unit has tabulated an increase in admissions in the
last four years by 100 per year, despite the fact that the
over-all population of mentally ill in the community has re-
mained stable during that time period. 0 7
The Triage Unit has re-admitted many of its former
patients who had been living in the community with the
assistance of DI and SSI cash and medical benefits. When
their benefits were terminated these patients lost their apart-
ments through eviction and ended up in the streets and/or
in the custody of the police. They then were sent to
emergency rooms in local hospitals, and were subsequently
transferred to RPC. Often, years of work by the treatment
team and the rehabilitation personnel were destroyed as
a result of this callous CDR policy. Again, it is important
to consider the fact that these disastrous effects are not
isolated atypical situations. During both the Senate and
House of Representatives' hearings, service providers and
mentally disabled persons from other states (e.g. Michigan,
Pennsylvania, Maryland and Texas) produced testimony
similar to the documentation in the Bellamy report.
One irony for people with mental disabilities arose out
of a temporary moratorium of the continuing disability
review process and the continuation of benefits to all disabl-
ed recipients undergoing administrative appeal. The
moratorium was announced by SSA on April 13, 1984.
Nearly 40,000 people were to be affected. However, on
May 21, 1984, Representative J.J. Pickle of the House of
Representatives Sub-Committee on Social Security de-
nounced SSA's failure to act on the moratorium, five weeks
after Secretary Heckler's announcement.' The
moratorium had prevented the termination of benefits of
current recipients. However, since SSA had not issued im-
plementing guidelines as of May 21, 1984, beneficiaries
whose benefits had already been terminated could not have
their benefits reinstated and were precluded from the ap-
peals process.' 9 The moratorium also excluded all cases
in class action suits, wherein the order stipulated that SSA
was to reopen all cases in the class, including those cases
which had already entered the Appellate stage."'
Representative Pickle denounced SSA's actions as in-
defensible. Pickle stated:
senseless failure to pay promised benefits
makes me wonder whether it is not really just
another part of a broader plan to reduce our
national deficit, in part at the expense of the
disabled. Subjecting thousands of disabled
Americans to such bureaucratic arrogance and
indifference is shameful. It ought to shock the
conscience of every American."I
Was Mr. Hooker's situation atypical, or does it repre-
sent a tragedy which has occurred throughout this coun-
try as a result of the callous and illegal operation of the
CDR program? This article has argued that Mr. Hooker
represents a nationwide tragedy. This is brought sharply
into focus by a news report of April 14, 1984 which stated
that 26 people nationwide had committed suicide as a
direct result of the stress and trauma resulting from hav-
ing their DI and SSI benefits terminated." 2
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